Conecta tu primer dispositivo

"""LM1 frame signing/verification + topic and configuration helpers.

This is the device-side mirror of the backend's own
`src/iot_manager/mqtt/signing.py` and `src/iot_manager/mqtt/topics.py`.
Every other sample in this folder imports from here, so the signing rules
exist exactly once.

Frame format
------------
    LM1.<mac>.<ts>.<body>

* `mac` - lowercase hex HMAC-SHA256 over the exact bytes
  `topic + "\\n" + ts + "\\n" + body`.
* `ts`  - Unix time in seconds, as decimal digits. The backend rejects a
  frame older than 3600 s or more than 300 s in the future, so keep the
  device clock NTP-synced.
* `body` - the exact JSON bytes you are publishing. Sign the bytes you
  send, never a re-serialized structure: key order, whitespace and float
  formatting all change the MAC.

The signing key is the device's own MQTT password - the same secret you
CONNECT with. Nothing extra to store.
"""

from __future__ import annotations

import hashlib
import hmac
import os
import threading
import time
from dataclasses import dataclass

_SCHEME_PREFIX = b"LM1."

# Freshness window enforced by the backend (config/settings.py:
# MQTT_SIGNATURE_MAX_AGE_SECONDS / MQTT_SIGNATURE_MAX_FUTURE_SKEW_SECONDS).
MAX_AGE_S = 3600
MAX_FUTURE_SKEW_S = 300


class SignatureError(Exception):
    """A received frame is malformed, forged, or outside the freshness window."""


# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# Signing / verification
# ------------------------------------------------------------------


def _compute_mac(topic: str, ts_bytes: bytes, body: bytes, key: str) -> str:
    signed_string = topic.encode() + b"\n" + ts_bytes + b"\n" + body
    return hmac.new(key.encode(), signed_string, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()


def sign_frame(topic: str, body: bytes, key: str, ts: int | None = None) -> bytes:
    """Build the signed LM1 frame to publish for `body`."""
    if ts is None:
        ts = int(time.time())
    ts_bytes = str(ts).encode()
    mac = _compute_mac(topic, ts_bytes, body, key)
    return _SCHEME_PREFIX + mac.encode() + b"." + ts_bytes + b"." + body


def verify_frame(topic: str, frame: bytes, key: str) -> bytes:
    """Verify an inbound LM1 frame (a command) and return its body bytes.

    Raises `SignatureError` on any failure - never returns an empty body
    for a rejected frame, so a caller cannot mistake one for the other.
    The MAC is checked before the timestamp, because `ts` is itself signed.
    """
    if not frame.startswith(_SCHEME_PREFIX):
        raise SignatureError("missing LM1 prefix")
    try:
        mac_hex, ts_bytes, body = frame[len(_SCHEME_PREFIX):].split(b".", 2)
    except ValueError:
        raise SignatureError("expected LM1.<mac>.<ts>.<body>") from None
    if not mac_hex or not ts_bytes:
        raise SignatureError("empty mac or timestamp field")
    try:
        ts = int(ts_bytes)
    except ValueError:
        raise SignatureError("non-integer timestamp") from None

    expected = _compute_mac(topic, ts_bytes, body, key).encode()
    if not hmac.compare_digest(mac_hex, expected):
        raise SignatureError("MAC mismatch")

    now = time.time()
    if ts < now - MAX_AGE_S:
        raise SignatureError("stale timestamp")
    if ts > now + MAX_FUTURE_SKEW_S:
        raise SignatureError("timestamp too far in the future")
    return body


# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# Topics
# ------------------------------------------------------------------


def device_topics(prefix: str, topic_id: str) -> dict[str, str]:
    """The only three topics a device may ever touch.

    One `telemetry` topic carries both a single reading and a batch
    (`{"messages": [...]}`) - the backend sniffs the body's shape. There
    is no status/presence topic: the dashboard marks a device offline on
    a per-device timeout instead, so there is no birth message or Last
    Will to publish.
    """
    base = f"{prefix}/{topic_id}"
    return {
        "telemetry": f"{base}/telemetry",
        "cmd": f"{base}/cmd",
        "cmdAck": f"{base}/cmd/ack",
    }


# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# Configuration (environment variables only - never hardcode a secret)
# ------------------------------------------------------------------


@dataclass(frozen=True)
class DeviceConfig:
    """Everything a device needs, read from the environment.

    Where each value comes from in the IoT Manager UI:

    * MQTT_HOST / MQTT_PORT - the broker address shown on the device's
      Credentials panel (mqtt.luminatti.online, port 8883, TLS only).
    * DEVICE_ID - the *MQTT username* on that same panel. The broker
      also requires the MQTT clientid to equal it, so the samples pass
      it for both.
    * DEVICE_PASSWORD - the `dvp_` MQTT password from the panel (shown
      once, when created or regenerated). A legacy `dvk_` Device API Key
      is also accepted as the MQTT password. Whichever one you connect
      with is ALSO your HMAC signing key.
    * DEVICE_TOPIC_ID - the short, opaque `topic_id` on the panel. It is
      not your device id, and it can be rotated on its own.
    * MQTT_TOPIC_PREFIX - `iot/v1` unless your deployment says otherwise.
    """

    host: str
    port: int
    username: str
    password: str
    topic_id: str
    topic_prefix: str

    @property
    def topics(self) -> dict[str, str]:
        return device_topics(self.topic_prefix, self.topic_id)


def load_config() -> DeviceConfig:
    """Read the device configuration from environment variables.

    Exits with a clear message when something is missing, instead of
    failing later with an opaque CONNECT refusal.
    """
    missing = [name for name in ("DEVICE_ID", "DEVICE_PASSWORD", "DEVICE_TOPIC_ID") if not os.getenv(name)]
    if missing:
        raise SystemExit(
            "Missing environment variable(s): "
            + ", ".join(missing)
            + "\nSet them from your device's Credentials panel in IoT Manager. Example:\n"
            '  export DEVICE_ID="your-mqtt-username"\n'
            '  export DEVICE_PASSWORD="your-mqtt-password"\n'
            '  export DEVICE_TOPIC_ID="your-topic-id"'
        )
    return DeviceConfig(
        host=os.getenv("MQTT_HOST", "mqtt.luminatti.online"),
        port=int(os.getenv("MQTT_PORT", "8883")),
        username=os.environ["DEVICE_ID"],
        password=os.environ["DEVICE_PASSWORD"],
        topic_id=os.environ["DEVICE_TOPIC_ID"],
        topic_prefix=os.getenv("MQTT_TOPIC_PREFIX", "iot/v1"),
    )


# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# Sequence numbers
# ------------------------------------------------------------------


class SequenceCounter:
    """Strictly-increasing `sequence` values for this device.

    Seeded from wall-clock time, NOT from 0 or 1. The backend keeps a
    durable high-water mark per device and drops any message whose
    `sequence` is <= the last one it accepted, so a counter that restarts
    low means every message after a reboot is silently discarded - and a
    device that previously used another transport already has a high mark
    on file. `int(time.time())` clears any plausible previous value and
    keeps increasing across restarts.

    Sequences must also strictly increase WITHIN a batch: call `next()`
    once per message you put in the `messages` list, in order.

    Thread-safe: the samples that answer commands call this from paho's
    network thread as well as from their own loop.
    """

    def __init__(self) -> None:
        self._lock = threading.Lock()
        self._value = int(time.time())

    def next(self) -> int:
        with self._lock:
            self._value += 1
            return self._value

// lm1.h - LM1 frame signing/verification + topic helpers for ESP32.
//
// Device-side mirror of the backend's src/iot_manager/mqtt/signing.py and
// src/iot_manager/mqtt/topics.py. Header-only; HMAC-SHA256 comes from the
// mbedtls that already ships with the ESP32 Arduino core, so there is no
// extra library to install for signing.
//
// Frame format:
//     LM1.<mac>.<ts>.<body>
// where <mac> is the lowercase-hex HMAC-SHA256 over the exact bytes
//     topic + "\n" + ts + "\n" + body
// and the key is the device's own MQTT password.
//
// The device clock MUST be NTP-synced (configTime(...) in setup(), then
// wait for time(nullptr) to pass ~1.7e9). The backend rejects a frame
// whose ts is more than 3600 s old or more than 300 s in the future, and
// an unsynced ESP32 starts at the epoch, so every frame it signs before
// the first sync is rejected without any error coming back.
//
// Configuration comes from compile-time defines so no secret ever lives
// in a committed source file. Inject them from your environment, e.g.
//
//   arduino-cli compile --fqbn esp32:esp32:esp32 \
//     --build-property "compiler.cpp.extra_flags=\
//        -DWIFI_SSID=\"$WIFI_SSID\" -DWIFI_PASSWORD=\"$WIFI_PASSWORD\" \
//        -DDEVICE_ID=\"$DEVICE_ID\" -DDEVICE_PASSWORD=\"$DEVICE_PASSWORD\" \
//        -DDEVICE_TOPIC_ID=\"$DEVICE_TOPIC_ID\"" 01_wifi_mqtt_connect
//
// Where each value comes from in the IoT Manager UI:
//   MQTT_HOST / MQTT_PORT   the broker on the device's Credentials panel
//                           (mqtt.luminatti.online : 8883, TLS only)
//   DEVICE_ID               the MQTT username on that panel; the broker
//                           also requires the clientid to equal it
//   DEVICE_PASSWORD         the dvp_ MQTT password from the panel, shown
//                           once at creation. It is ALSO the signing key.
//   DEVICE_TOPIC_ID         the short opaque topic_id on the panel
//   MQTT_TOPIC_PREFIX       "iot/v1" unless your deployment says otherwise

#ifndef LUMINATTI_LM1_H
#define LUMINATTI_LM1_H

#include <Arduino.h>
#include <mbedtls/md.h>
#include <time.h>

#ifndef MQTT_HOST
#define MQTT_HOST "mqtt.luminatti.online"
#endif
#ifndef MQTT_PORT
#define MQTT_PORT 8883
#endif
#ifndef MQTT_TOPIC_PREFIX
#define MQTT_TOPIC_PREFIX "iot/v1"
#endif
#ifndef DEVICE_ID
#define DEVICE_ID ""  // set from the environment - see the header comment
#endif
#ifndef DEVICE_PASSWORD
#define DEVICE_PASSWORD ""
#endif
#ifndef DEVICE_TOPIC_ID
#define DEVICE_TOPIC_ID ""
#endif
#ifndef WIFI_SSID
#define WIFI_SSID ""
#endif
#ifndef WIFI_PASSWORD
#define WIFI_PASSWORD ""
#endif

// Freshness window enforced by the backend.
static const long LM1_MAX_AGE_S = 3600;
static const long LM1_MAX_FUTURE_SKEW_S = 300;

// Payload cap: the backend drops any frame over 64 KB before verifying it.
static const size_t LM1_MAX_FRAME_BYTES = 65536;

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------
// Topics - the only three a device may ever touch. There is no status or
// presence topic: the dashboard marks a device offline on a timeout, so
// there is no birth message and no Last Will to configure.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------

inline String lm1TelemetryTopic() {
  return String(MQTT_TOPIC_PREFIX) + "/" + DEVICE_TOPIC_ID + "/telemetry";
}

inline String lm1CommandTopic() {
  return String(MQTT_TOPIC_PREFIX) + "/" + DEVICE_TOPIC_ID + "/cmd";
}

inline String lm1CommandAckTopic() {
  return String(MQTT_TOPIC_PREFIX) + "/" + DEVICE_TOPIC_ID + "/cmd/ack";
}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------
// HMAC-SHA256
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------

inline String lm1HmacSha256Hex(const String &key, const String &message) {
  byte digest[32];
  mbedtls_md_context_t ctx;
  mbedtls_md_init(&ctx);
  mbedtls_md_setup(&ctx, mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256), 1);
  mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&ctx, (const unsigned char *)key.c_str(), key.length());
  mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&ctx, (const unsigned char *)message.c_str(), message.length());
  mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&ctx, digest);
  mbedtls_md_free(&ctx);

  String hex;
  hex.reserve(64);
  for (int i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
    char pair[3];
    snprintf(pair, sizeof(pair), "%02x", digest[i]);
    hex += pair;
  }
  return hex;
}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------
// Sign / verify
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------

// Builds the frame to publish. Sign the EXACT body bytes you are about to
// send - never a re-serialized copy: key order, whitespace and float
// formatting all change the MAC.
inline String lm1SignFrame(const String &topic, const String &body, const String &key) {
  String ts = String((unsigned long)time(nullptr));
  String mac = lm1HmacSha256Hex(key, topic + "\n" + ts + "\n" + body);
  return "LM1." + mac + "." + ts + "." + body;
}

// Constant-time comparison of two equal-length hex MACs. A plain `==`
// leaks how many leading characters matched through its timing; that is
// exactly what the backend's hmac.compare_digest avoids, and firmware
// answering commands should do the same.
inline bool lm1SecureEquals(const String &a, const String &b) {
  if (a.length() != b.length()) {
    return false;
  }
  uint8_t diff = 0;
  for (size_t i = 0; i < a.length(); i++) {
    diff |= (uint8_t)(a[i] ^ b[i]);
  }
  return diff == 0;
}

// Verifies an inbound frame (a command from the backend). On success
// writes the body into `bodyOut` and returns true; returns false and
// leaves `bodyOut` untouched on any failure.
//
// The MAC is checked BEFORE the timestamp, because ts is itself signed:
// checking freshness on an unauthenticated frame would only leak
// information to someone with no valid key.
inline bool lm1VerifyFrame(const String &topic, const String &frame, const String &key, String &bodyOut) {
  if (!frame.startsWith("LM1.")) {
    return false;
  }
  int firstDot = frame.indexOf('.', 4);
  if (firstDot < 0) {
    return false;
  }
  int secondDot = frame.indexOf('.', firstDot + 1);
  if (secondDot < 0) {
    return false;
  }

  String mac = frame.substring(4, firstDot);
  String ts = frame.substring(firstDot + 1, secondDot);
  String body = frame.substring(secondDot + 1);
  if (mac.length() == 0 || ts.length() == 0) {
    return false;
  }

  String expected = lm1HmacSha256Hex(key, topic + "\n" + ts + "\n" + body);
  if (!lm1SecureEquals(mac, expected)) {
    return false;
  }

  long age = (long)time(nullptr) - ts.toInt();
  if (age > LM1_MAX_AGE_S || age < -LM1_MAX_FUTURE_SKEW_S) {
    return false;
  }

  bodyOut = body;
  return true;
}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------
// Sequence numbers
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// The backend keeps a durable high-water mark per device and drops any
// message whose `sequence` is <= the last one it accepted. A counter that
// restarts at 0 or 1 therefore works exactly once and is silently ignored
// after every reboot - and a device that previously used another
// transport already has a high mark on file. Seed from wall-clock time
// (after NTP sync) so the counter clears any previous value and keeps
// increasing across restarts.
//
// Sequences must also strictly increase WITHIN a batch: call next() once
// per message, in the order they appear in the "messages" array.
class Lm1Sequence {
 public:
  void begin() { value_ = (unsigned long)time(nullptr); }
  unsigned long next() { return ++value_; }

 private:
  unsigned long value_ = 0;
};

// Blocks until the clock is plausibly NTP-synced. Call after WiFi is up
// and before signing anything.
inline bool lm1WaitForClock(unsigned long timeoutMs = 20000) {
  configTime(0, 0, "pool.ntp.org", "time.nist.gov");
  unsigned long start = millis();
  while (time(nullptr) < 1700000000L) {
    if (millis() - start > timeoutMs) {
      return false;
    }
    delay(200);
  }
  return true;
}

#endif  // LUMINATTI_LM1_H